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Abstract 
 
Through a long-period analysis of the inter-temporal relations between the French markets for 
credit default swaps (CDS), shares and bonds between 2001 and 2008, this article shows how 
a financial innovation like CDS could heighten financial instability. After describing the 
operating principles of credit derivatives in general and CDS in particular, we construct two 
difference VAR models on the series: the share return rates, the variation in bond spreads and 
the variation in CDS spreads for thirteen French companies, with the aim of bringing to light 
the relations between these three markets. According to these models, there is indeed an 
interdependence between the French share, CDS and bond markets, with a strong influence of 
the share market on the other two. This interdependence increases during periods of tension 
on the markets (2001-2002, and since the summer of 2007). 
 
Key words: credit derivatives, credit risk, credit default swap, inter-temporal relations 
between markets, VAR models 
JEL classification: G10; C32 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last ten years, with the increase in the number of business bankruptcies and the 
introduction of a regulatory framework, lending institutions have started actively to manage 
their credit risk. This has resulted in the rapid development of markets in instruments of risk 
transfer, including credit derivatives. These latter can be defined as financial contracts 
reflecting the value of the risk attached to a loan contract. The principle is quite simple. The 
lending institutions seek to protect themselves against the credit risk, i.e. against the risk of 
loss incurred in the event of default on the credit. This can be done either by transferring the 
asset bearing the risk, through what are known as “funded” credit derivatives, or by simply 
transferring the risk attached to the credit by means of “unfunded” derivatives. In the case of 
funded derivatives, the underlying risky asset disappears from the balance sheet of the 
institution buying the protection, while the institution selling the protection buys a bond or 
debt which then appears in its balance sheet. Where unfunded derivatives are concerned, the 
underlying asset is not transferred and only the instrument of risk transfer appears, in or 
outside the balance sheet depending on the instrument used. In practice, however, the use of 
these instruments raises certain problems and criticisms. These problems are related to the 
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very nature of the contracts, the means of determining the prices of these new products, the 
lack of transparency of credit derivative markets and the interdependence of these negotiated 
markets with other markets, including share and bond markets. This article has a double aim. 
Through an analysis of credit default swaps, the most commonly-used form of credit 
derivative†, it will seek to expose both the advantages and the limitations of these instruments 
of risk transfer. Based on an empiricial study of the inter-temporal relations between the 
French CDS, share and bond markets over the period 2001-2008, it will show how these 
derivatives can be the source of financial instability. In the second section, it will situate 
credit derivatives in relation to other instruments of credit risk transfer, before focusing more 
particularly on credit default swaps and the literature analysing the relations between the 
markets for CDS, shares and bonds. The third section presents the credit derivatives market 
and the empirical data. The econometric method used, the main hypotheses tested and the 
principal results are presented in the fourth section. 
 
2. Credit derivatives: “simple” instruments of coverage? 
2.1. Credit derivatives: one of several instruments of risk transfer  
Before drawing up a typology of the different instruments of credit risk transfer available to 
lending institutions and the place of credit derivatives within this typology, it is worth 
recalling the different forms of underlying credits involved. These can be grouped into two 
categories: consumer credits (credits outstanding on credit cards, residential real estate loans, 
loans and financing for the purchase of cars), and securities on transferable and non-
transferable loans and debts (customer debts, financing on plant and machinery, commercial 
mortgages, private sector and sovereign debt). The underlying credit constitutes the primary 
criterion for the classification of instruments of credit risk transfer. Credit derivatives only 
concern transferable and non-transferable private sector and sovereign debts, in the form of 
loans and bonds. To this criterion, we can add that of the modality of transfer of the 
underlying asset (the funding), depending on whether it is transferred from the buyer of the 
protection to the seller, or whether only the risk is transferred. Unlike other instruments of 
risk transfer, the use of credit derivatives does not result in the loaan being removed from the 
balance sheet of the buyer of the protection, and consequently requires no financing on the 
part of the seller of the protection. 
 
                                                 
† According to the 2006 Fitch survey, the total nominal value of credit derivatives at the end of 2005 stood at 
nearly 12 trillion dollars, nearly half of which was constituted by CDS. 
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If a lending institution has sovereign and/or private sector debts among its assets, and if it 
wishes to keep these assets in its balance sheet, maintaining their legal characteristics and the 
commercial relation with its customers, while at the same time protecting itself against the 
risk of default by these customers, then it has the choice between four different instruments, 
including credit derivatives. These latter correspond to four main types of derivatives, 
described as “single name” when they cover one sole reference entity (the issuer of the debt 
for which the lender is seeking coverage), or “portfolio” when there is a basket or portfolio of 
reference entities (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 : Credit derivatives 
 « Funded » « Unfunded » 
« single name » « Credit linked notes » : CLN 
« Credit default swap »: CDS 
« Credit swap option »: CSO 
« Total swap return »: TSR 
« portfolio » CLN « First-to-default swap »: FTD 
 
Whatever the type of credit derivative, it is characterised by at least six parameters:  
- the initial contract: the underlying loan or asset that the lending institution is seeking 
to cover, characterised essentially by an amount, a maturity and a rate; 
-  the coverage contract: the derivative enabling the institution to protect itself against 
the credit risk, characterised by an amount covered, a maturity and a premium called 
the spread; 
-  the buyer of the protection or seller of the risk: two terms defining the institution 
which can present the initial loaan in its assets and which can use the credit derivative 
as an instrument of credit risk coverage; 
-  the reference entity or borrower deemed by the lending institution to represent a credit 
risk; 
-  the seller of the protection or buyer of the risk: the institution that undertakes to pay a 
certain sum in the case of a “credit event” on the reference entity. In the case of the 
seller of protection, the credit derivative is used as an instrument of investment, as it is 
buying a risk from the counterparty without having to fund and establish a commercial 
relation with this latter; 
-  the credit event corresponding to the occurrence of the credit risk; this may take 
different forms such as the bankruptcy of the reference entity, default on payment, or 
restructuring of its debt. 
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Most of these parameters must be defined within the frame of a contract drawn up between 
the buyer and seller of the protection. Credit derivative contracts have the particularity that 
they can be negotiated separately from the underlying asset. Because of this, they can be used 
as trading instruments, in other words with the sole aim of producing short-term value-added 
through the hoped-for evolution of the credit risk. 
 
2.2. CDS: “first” among credit derivatives‡
A CDS is a contract by which the buyer of protection (A) pays a regular premium (usually 
every quarter) to the seller (C), who undertakes to compensate (A) for the loss incurred on the 
underlying asset if a credit event takes place in the reference entity (B) (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: 
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The CDS has no effect on the conditions of the initial contract; the lending institution (A) 
receives the interest and repayments of the capital loaned from the reference entity (B) as long 
as no credit event occurs. The lender (A) is not obliged to inform the borrower (B) of the 
establishment, with the counterparty (C), of an operation of coverage of the credit risk 
attached to their commercial relation. The buyer of the protection (A) pays the seller 
protection (C) a regular premium corresponding to the value of the CDS contract, expressed 
in “basis points”. This annual premium, or its equivalent, is inversely proportional to the 
credit rating of the borrower (B). By paying this premium, the buyer of the protection 
acquires the right, if a credit event occurs in the reference entity (B), to receive a payment 
from the seller of the  protection (C), corresponding to the market value at the date of 
 
‡ For a presentation of the different instruments of risk transfer and other credit derivatives, see notably 
BATTEN J., HOGAN W. (2002); BIS (2003); KIFF J., MICHAUD F. L. and MITCHELL J. (2003). 
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establishment of the CDS contract on the debts issued by a borrower with the same credit 
rating. 
 
Rather than swaps, CDS correspond to put options on the credit risk of an underlying asset. In 
return for the payment of a premium, the buyer of the CDS has the right to “exercise” this 
protection in the case of a credit event on the underlying asset, and to receive payment from 
the protection seller of a sum defined in the CDS. In the case of standard options, however, 
the buyer’s profit (the seller’s loss) can be illimited. With CDS, when a credit event occurs, 
the one’s profit and the other’s loss are fixed, corresponding to the amount of the indemnity 
minus the premium. If, on maturity of a CDS contract (which need not correspond to the 
maturity of the underlying asset covered), the initial borrower (B) has not defaulted, then the 
protection seller (C) makes a profit equal to the total premium received, and the protection 
buyer (A) makes a loss equal to the total premium paid minus the reduction in regulatory 
capital requirements. For the intial lender (A), CDS has a double interest: not only can the 
lender transfer the credit risk, it can also reduce its capital requirements, by declaring as 
counterparty of the underlying asset not the initial borrower (B), but the protection seller (C), 
less risky and with a better credit rating. CDS also has a double interest for the protection 
seller, in that it makes a profit and diversifies its portfolio. 
 
Let us take a concrete example: that of CDS on the entity France Telecom. On 08/02/2007 the 
five year CDS spread was 23.5 basis points, meaning that the protection buyer who, for 
example, wished to cover 10 million euros, would have to pay 5.875 basis points, i.e. a 
premium of 5,875 euros every quarter over five years: a total of 117,500 euros. If a credit 
event was to occur in the reference entity France Télécom before 08/02/2012, the protection 
seller would pay the buyer the total covered (10 million euros) minus the amount recovered 
from liquidation of the entity, that is to say, with a recovery rate of 40%, six million euros. On 
the other hand, if the entity France Telecom has not defaulted before 08/02/2012, then the 
protection seller will have paid nothing during the whole lifespan of the CDS. The CDS 
spread is an indicator of the market valuation of the credit risk on an entity, and the evolution 
of this spread gives us information about the market’s perception of this risk. Thus, for France 
Telecom, the five-year CDS spread was 730 basis points on 26 June 2002. The buyer of this 
contract therefore undertook to pay 182,500 euros every quarter during five years (i.e. a total 
of 3,650,000 euros!). Between 26 June 2002 and 08/02/2007, the market therefore strongly 
downgraded the credit risk for France Telecom. 
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CDS contracts can be negotiated independently of the underlying asset. In this case, the 
protection buyer (A) has no lending contract with the entity (B), but it establishes a CDS 
contract on (B) with the protection seller (C) with the simple aim of making a profit. This is 
the profit it can make by re-selling the CDS contract at a higher price, in the event of an 
increase in the credit risk on the entity (B). CDS can be used as trading instruments, with the 
sole objective of producing short-term added-value on the predicted evolution of the credit 
risk. The buyer of the CDS expects a rise in the credit risk, while the buyer expects a fall. 
 
The buyer and seller of protection must be able to evaluate the credit risk, to attribute a price 
to it. To determine this price or spread, they use credit risk assessment models. Two types of 
model are generally opposed: structural models (MERTON, 1974) and reduced-form models 
(JARROW and TURNBULL, 1995 and 2000; HULL and WHITE, 2000 and 2001). They two 
categories of models differ on a number of points. In structural models, the financial structure 
of the entity (the weight of the debt) is taken into consideration, the value of the entity’s assets 
is modelled, and the default can be predicted. In reduced-form models, the fundamentals of 
the entity are ignored, only the default time is modelled, without any reference to the entity’s 
assets, and the default is totally unpredictable. Structural models enable the spread to be 
assessed on the basis of fundamental variables, while reduced-form models consider the 
spread as a given. However, whatever the type of model, three essential parameters must be 
determined in order to measure the credit risk: the probability of default, the loss in the event 
of default and the correlation between the two. Now, the determination of these three 
parameters depends on the information available. Accessible, good-quality information allows 
the default to be predicted, while a lack of information may make it impossible to predict the 
default, justifying the use of reduced-form modelling.  
 
The reduced-form approach enables us to relate CDS spreads to bond spreads, that is to say, 
the difference between the bond yield and the yield of a risk-free asset (DUFFIE and 
SINGLETON, 1999). If we consider a market without arbitrage and a risk-neutral default 
probability, then there is a relation of equivalence between the two spreads. This means that 
the risk assessment is the same on the CDS market and the bond market. In a market without 
arbitrage, we can construct a replication portfolio, which consists in selling short the fixed-
rate bond with the same maturity as the CDS and investing in a risk-free asset. The value of 
this portfolio is equal to the CDS spread on the entity that issued the bonds. If, for a given 
entity and a given maturity, the CDS spread and the bond spread are not equal, then arbitrage 
is possible on the markets. When the CDS spread is higher than the bond spread, investors 
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make a profit by selling the CDS on the derivatives market and buying a risk-free asset and 
the entity’s bond on the bond market.  
 
Using an econometric study of the relation of equivalence between CDS and bond spreads, 
ZHU (2004) showed that over the long term, this relation is verified. The two spreads evolve 
together over the long term, but there are shoret-term differences. They react differently to 
changes in the credit quality of the entity. The derivatives market adapts more quickly than 
the bond market, where the movements lag behind those of the CDS. Several factors might 
explain a gap between the two spreads. Bonds are influenced by liquidity, by their life-span, 
which decreases every day, while the CDS market quotes a set of credit events for a entity 
with a constant due date. Bonds can include particular clauses such as convertibility into 
securities, the use of collaterals, which directly affects their value. The eventual impossibility 
of selling short on the bond market justifies a positive gap between the two spreads. 
 
The structural approach enables us to bring to light a relation between the CDS market and 
the share market. This approach, developed by MERTON (1974), proposes an interpretation 
of the relations between shareholders and lenders drawn from the theory of options. It 
considers that the return profile of the shareholder is similar to that of a call option, and the 
return profile of the creditor is similar to that of a put option. The more the value of the 
company’s assets increases, the greater the profit the shareholder makes from his shares, after 
repayment of lenders. The value of the company’s assets is determined on the basis of an 
option model and the information contained in the asset price is assumed to contain implicit 
information on default. For the lender, the value of the assets must be higher than or equal to 
the debt, if he is to be reimbursed in the event of bankruptcy. The company defaults when the 
value of its assets falls below a certain threshold, generally situated somewhere near the value 
of the debt. Assessment of the probability of default therefore depends on future probability 
distribution of the share price, relative to the level of debt. A fall in the share market leads to a 
rise in credit spreads, implying a rise in the probability of default and an increase in the 
demand for protection (through CDS). To honour their commitments, protection sellers take 
position on the share market by selling short or to close. The initial shock spreads and the 
liquidity of the share market falls. This shock may spread to other markets if the protection 
sellers are forced to sell assets other than shares. 
 
From the moment that structural models can be used to determine, for a given entity, the 
proportions in which the CDS spread should evolve for a given variation in the share price, it 
 7
is possible to use the share market to cover credit risk. An investor in an entity’s bonds can 
cover his portfolio either by buying protection on the CDS market or by selling short shares in 
the same company in the proportions indicated by the structural model. If the bonds market 
deteriorates, the loss on the bonds will be compensated for by the gain from the protection or 
from the sale of shares. If all bond investors adopt this same covering strategy, the fall in the 
bond market will accelerate and spread to the other markets. 
 
On a theoretical level, these two approaches bring to light the relations between the three 
markets: shares, bonds and CDS. In what follows, this article will seek to measure the extent 
of these relations, through an econometric study. 
 
3. Presentation of the credit derivatives market and the data used 
3.1. A credit derivatives market dominated by CDS 
The credit derivatives market is experiencing strong growth§. According to surveys by the 
credit ratings agency Fitch, the total nominal value of credit derivatives grew from 3 trillion 
dollars in 2003 to 12 trillion dollars in 2005, with CDS contracts representing nearly half of 
this total. This market is dominated by short-term contracts; more than 80% of contracts have 
a maturity date of five years or less. Now, an instrument of coverage loses its efficiency when 
its maturity is lower than that of the underlying loan. 
 
The banks are the main actors in this market, both as buyers and sellers of protection, 
although they are, overall, net buyers of protection (for a total of 268 billion dollars in 2005). 
However, some British and Swiss banks have become net sellers of protection. They use 
credit derivatives more as financial instruments for the diversification of income sources 
rather than as an instrument of coverage for their asset portfolios. The main net sellers of 
protection are insurance and reinsurance companies, pension funds and hedge funds, with 20 
to 30% of market activity in 2005. The credit risk is thus transferred from the big international 
banks to insurance companies and funds, but also to regional banks, notably German ones. 
These regional banks are turning to this market as a means of diversifying their portfolios by 
regions and sectors of activity. They use credit derivatives as instruments to generate 
additional income. Today, credit risks are ultimately transferred to financial institutions that 
have less ability to manage the risk and to deal with the losses incurred when credit events do 
                                                 
§ The data on this market are widely dispersed. Public data remain insufficient and private data (British Bankers’ 
Association (BBA) and Fitch are the main suppliers of data on this market) are based on questionnaires and 
should be treated with caution. The figures quoted in this paragraph (3.1.) are drawn from Fitch surveys. 
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occur. The credit derivatives market is very concentrated. In 2005, fifteen institutions were 
responsible for 86% of total volumes**. Now, high concentration tends to increase the 
counterparty risk. 
 
The reference entities of credit derivatives are few in number. In 2005, 62% of them were 
companies (with General Motors, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motors and France Telecom far 
ahead of the others), 18% were financial institutions (Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan) and 4% were States (Brazil, Italy, and Russia). To an ever increasing extent, the 
credit derivatives market involves the entities with the worst credit ratings and therefore the 
highest levels of risk††. Between 2003 and 2005, the share of entities with a rating of at least 
“A” fell from 60% to 33%, while the share of “speculative grade” entities (rated below BBB) 
grew from 20% to 37%. 
 
3.2. The data base on the French CDS, share and bond markets 
We have chosen thirteen French companies for our study (including 11 in the CAC40), from 
twelve different sectors of activity and representing a total market capitalization of nearly 600 
billion euros on 23/04/07. For each company, and over the period 2001 - February 2008, we 
have noted the daily share prices and the daily five-year CDS spreads, and we have calculated 
the five-year bond spreads (from January 2001 to February 2007). This gave us a total of 
60,000 items of data (Table 2). Out of the thirteen companies, two, Alcatel and Rhodia were 
rated as “speculative grade”, and both of them saw their rating slip over the period in 
question. None of the companies were rated triple A and only three were rated double A. 
                                                 
** The French banks are active on this market, as there are four of them among the top twenty-five operators. In 
terms of volume, at the end of 2005, BNP Paribas was in 10th position; the Société Générale and Calyon were in 
17th and 18th position respectively. 
†† The principle of credit-rating is that the less risky the entity, the higher the rating. For Standard and Poor’s, for 
example, the best rating is triple A (AAA); the worst is D for issuers who have defaulted. It uses the following 
rating grid: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, D. An entity is considered “investment grade” when it is 
attributed a rating AAA, AA, A or BBB. Entities with ratings under BBB are considered “speculative grade” and 
present a very high credit risk. 
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Table 2: Firm characteristics 
 Period Sector Market Capitalization (€) 
the 23/04/07  
Number off 
observations 
(CDS, 
bonds, 
stocks) 
Alcatel 26/06/2001 – 21/02/2008 
Communications 
Equipment 21 480 016 011,30 3,61 4 941 
Sanofi-
Aventis 
04/09/2001 - 
21/02/2008 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry 90 959 774 639,53 15,28 4 849 
BNP 
Paribas 
03/09/2001 - 
21/02/2008 Banks 79 761 110 895,00 13,40 4 825 
Bouygues 19/06/2002 - 21/02/2008 
Construction and 
Related Machinery 20 043 133 894,21 3,37 4 428 
Carrefour 04/09/2001 - 21/02/2008 Grocery Stores 40 574 200 332,96 6,82 4 850 
Danone 04/09/2001 - 21/02/2008 Packaged Foods 32 396 792 805,74 5,44 4 607 
France 
Télécom 
29/08/2001 - 
21/02/2008 
Integrated 
Telecommunication 
Services 
54 713 063 223,00 9,19 4 811 
Pinault PR 15/03/2002 - 21/02/2008 Department Stores 16 314 170 907,18 2,74 4 404 
Rhodia 25/03/2002 - 21/02/2008 
Specialty 
Chemicals 3 588 474 798,52 0,60 4 516 
Renault 29/08/2001 - 21/02/2008 Automobile 26 539 043 170,52 4,46 4 835 
Société 
Générale 
03/09/2001 - 
21/02/2008 Banks 69 836 607 458,70 11,73 4 664 
Sodexho 22/07/2002 - 21/02/2008 Restaurants 8 981 811 806,24 1,51 4 254 
Total 04/09/2001 - 21/02/2008 
Integrated Oil & 
Gas 129 927 028 347,90 21,83 4 643 
Totaux  12 595 115 228 290,80 100,00 60 627 
 
The daily share return, denoted RS, is calculated without dividends, and corresponds to a 
simple variation in price:  
observed  price  share   the:Pwith 
 log
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
−t
t
t P
PRS
 
 
The daily CDS spread (denoted by CDS) is calculated as the average between the bid and the 
ask price for the five-year CDS (the most widely-exchanged maturity). This spread is 
expressed in 100 base index. 
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The bond spread (denoted by BOND), expressed in 100 base index is obtained by calculating 
the difference between the actuarial return rate of the five-year bond with the daily interest 
rate of the five-year swap curve. For each company, we took the actuarial return rate of a 
fixed-rate, non-convertible, non-puttable and non-callable five-year bond. When such a bond 
did not exist, either we calculated the actuarial return rate by interpolation between the rate of 
bonds of more than five years and those of less than five years maturity, or we took the return 
rate of bonds of at least three and a half years maturity. 
From observation of the three variables, we note (Figures 2, 3 and 4):  
- Sharp falls in share prices and negative, very volatile share return rates in 2001 and 2002 for 
all the companies. Rising prices and positive return rates from 2005-2006 up until summer 
2007 (the start of the subprime crisis). The thirteen series of share returns appear to be 
stationary. 
- The CDS spreads reached their highest level in 2002. They experienced a period of decline 
from 2004 before starting to rise again in summer 2007. The gaps between bids and asks fell 
strongly over the last few years, expressing greater market maturity. The thirteen CDS 
spreads appear to be non-stationary. 
- The bond spreads were very high in 2001, 2002 and 2003 and have been falling since then. 
In early 2007, out of the thirteen companies, only Rhodia had a return rate above 5%. The 
thirteen bond spreads appear to be non-stationary. 
 
We have calculated the mean and the volatility for each variable for each year. Three sub-
periods stand out: 
- 2001-2002: share return rates were mainly negative and very volatile, the CDS and BOND 
credit spreads were very high and volatile. The companies with the worst credit ratings had 
the highest and most volatile spreads. 
- 2003-2004: the credit spreads showed a downward trend and became less volatile. Overall, 
share return rates were low, with lower volatility. 
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 Figure 2 : Share returns (2001-2008) 
Action ALCATEL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Cours Rendement
Action CARREFOUR
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Cours Rendement
Action DANONE
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Cours Rendement
Action FRANCE TELECOM
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Cours Rendement
Action PINAULT
0
50
100
150
200
250
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Cours Rendement
Action RHODIA
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Cours Rendement
Action RENAULT
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
Cours Rendement
Action SOCIETE GENERALE
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Cours Rendement
Action SODEXHO
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
Cours Rendement
Action TOTAL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
Cours Rendement
Action AVENTIS
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
Cours Rendement
Action BNPPARIBAS
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Cours Rendement
Action BOUYGUES
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
6/
01
10
/1
2/
01
05
/0
6/
02
20
/1
1/
02
15
/0
5/
03
30
/1
0/
03
22
/0
4/
04
07
/1
0/
04
24
/0
3/
05
12
/0
9/
05
28
/0
2/
06
18
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
30
/0
7/
07
17
/0
1/
08
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Cours Rendement
Source : Fininfo 
 12
Figure 3 : CDS spreads (2001-2008) 
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Figure 4 : Bonds spreads (2001-2007) 
Bonds AVENTIS
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
5/
01
16
/1
0/
01
11
/0
3/
02
05
/0
8/
02
27
/1
2/
02
22
/0
5/
03
13
/1
0/
03
05
/0
3/
04
29
/0
7/
04
17
/1
2/
04
17
/0
5/
05
06
/1
0/
05
28
/0
2/
06
24
/0
7/
06
12
/1
2/
06
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
Taux Spread
Bonds ALCATEL
0,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
5/
01
16
/1
0/
01
11
/0
3/
02
12
/0
8/
02
10
/0
1/
03
05
/0
6/
03
24
/1
0/
03
18
/0
3/
04
11
/0
8/
04
05
/0
1/
05
31
/0
5/
05
19
/1
0/
05
13
/0
3/
06
04
/0
8/
06
27
/1
2/
06
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Taux Spread
Bonds BNPPARIBAS
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
02
/0
1/
01
06
/0
6/
01
31
/1
0/
01
10
/0
4/
02
05
/0
9/
02
31
/0
1/
03
26
/0
6/
03
14
/1
1/
03
08
/0
4/
04
31
/0
8/
04
18
/0
1/
05
09
/0
6/
05
27
/1
0/
05
21
/0
3/
06
24
/0
8/
06
23
/0
1/
07
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Taux Spread
Bonds BOUYGUES
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
02
/0
1/
01
28
/0
6/
01
19
/1
1/
01
16
/0
4/
02
09
/0
9/
02
31
/0
1/
03
26
/0
6/
03
14
/1
1/
03
08
/0
4/
04
02
/0
9/
04
26
/0
1/
05
21
/0
6/
05
09
/1
1/
05
03
/0
4/
06
25
/0
8/
06
18
/0
1/
07
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Taux Spread
Bonds CARREFOUR
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
02
/0
1/
01
25
/0
5/
01
16
/1
0/
01
11
/0
3/
02
05
/0
8/
02
27
/1
2/
02
22
/0
5/
03
13
/1
0/
03
05
/0
3/
04
29
/0
7/
04
17
/1
2/
04
17
/0
5/
05
06
/1
0/
05
28
/0
2/
06
24
/0
7/
06
12
/1
2/
06
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Taux Spread
Bonds DANONE
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
02
/0
1/
01
05
/0
6/
01
05
/1
2/
01
16
/0
1/
03
28
/0
5/
03
02
/1
0/
03
11
/0
2/
04
22
/0
6/
04
27
/1
0/
04
08
/0
3/
05
18
/0
7/
05
22
/1
1/
05
31
/0
3/
06
10
/0
8/
06
15
/1
2/
06
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Taux Spread
Bonds FRANCE TELECOM
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
02
/0
1/
01
11
/0
5/
01
18
/0
9/
01
28
/0
1/
02
05
/0
6/
02
09
/1
0/
02
06
/0
3/
03
15
/0
8/
03
20
/0
1/
04
28
/0
5/
04
05
/1
0/
04
14
/0
2/
05
24
/0
6/
05
31
/1
0/
05
09
/0
3/
06
19
/0
7/
06
23
/1
1/
06
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Taux Spread
Bonds PINAULT
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
09
/0
1/
01
03
/1
2/
01
16
/0
4/
02
21
/0
8/
02
27
/1
2/
02
25
/0
6/
03
06
/1
1/
03
17
/0
3/
04
27
/0
7/
04
01
/1
2/
04
14
/0
4/
05
22
/0
8/
05
29
/1
2/
05
10
/0
5/
06
15
/0
9/
06
24
/0
1/
07
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Taux Spread
Bonds RHODIA
0,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
19
/0
3/
01
27
/0
7/
01
03
/1
2/
01
16
/0
4/
02
23
/0
8/
02
03
/0
1/
03
14
/0
5/
03
19
/0
9/
03
29
/0
1/
04
09
/0
6/
04
14
/1
0/
04
23
/0
2/
05
05
/0
7/
05
09
/1
1/
05
20
/0
3/
06
28
/0
7/
06
04
/1
2/
06
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Taux Spread
Bonds RENAULT
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
02
/0
1/
01
11
/0
5/
01
18
/0
9/
01
28
/0
1/
02
10
/0
6/
02
15
/1
0/
02
24
/0
2/
03
04
/0
7/
03
10
/1
1/
03
22
/0
4/
04
31
/0
8/
04
10
/0
1/
05
19
/0
5/
05
26
/0
9/
05
02
/0
2/
06
14
/0
6/
06
19
/1
0/
06
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Taux Spread
Bonds SOCIETE GENERALE
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
02
/0
1/
01
11
/0
6/
01
22
/1
1/
01
09
/0
4/
02
16
/0
8/
02
23
/1
2/
02
07
/0
5/
03
24
/0
9/
03
10
/0
2/
04
19
/0
7/
04
31
/1
2/
04
25
/0
5/
05
18
/1
0/
05
21
/0
3/
06
30
/0
8/
06
07
/0
2/
07
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Taux Spread
Bonds SODEXHO
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
02
/0
1/
01
24
/0
5/
01
19
/1
0/
01
25
/0
3/
02
13
/0
1/
03
22
/0
5/
03
29
/0
9/
03
06
/0
2/
04
17
/0
6/
04
22
/1
0/
04
03
/0
3/
05
15
/0
7/
05
21
/1
1/
05
30
/0
3/
06
09
/0
8/
06
14
/1
2/
06
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Taux Spread
Bonds TOTAL
0,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
02
/0
1/
01
11
/0
5/
01
18
/0
9/
01
28
/0
1/
02
06
/0
6/
02
10
/1
0/
02
19
/0
3/
03
26
/0
9/
03
26
/0
3/
04
26
/1
0/
04
08
/0
4/
05
28
/0
9/
05
16
/0
2/
06
22
/0
6/
06
26
/1
0/
06
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Taux Spread  
Source : Fininfo 
 
 14
- 2005-2007: overall, share return rates rose, with relatively low volatility, and the credit 
spreads continued their downward trend. Companies whose ratings had been downgraded saw 
their spreads increase, while those whose ratings had been upgraded saw their spreads fall. 
Since the subprime crisis, there has been negative and volatile average share return rates for 
the thirteen companies, together with a strong rise in CDS spreads. For six of the thirteen 
companies, CDS spreads reached their highest levels since 2001. According to the CDS 
market, the credit risk on these companies from different sectors of activity had all risen 
sharply. To give one example: from 01/06/2007 to 21/02/2008 the CDS spread on the entities 
Société Générale and Danone rose from 6.8 to 101.54 and from 8.42 to 100.18 respectively! 
The losses incurred by the Société Générale may partly explain the strong rise in the spread 
for this entity, but how can we explain the massive increase in the credit risk assessment for 
Danone and other companies outside the banking sector? It would appear that this is the 
consequence of behaviour by investors using the CDS market more to diversify theit 
portfolios than to cover credit risks. 
 
We have calculated the coefficients of correlation between the three variables for the period 
2001-2007 (Table 3). From this matrix of average correlations, we can observe negative 
correlations between share return rates and bond spreads, and between share return rates and 
CDS spreads. The correlation between the two credit spreads is positive but weak. This result 
shows the existence of diversification gains between the three markets and partly explains the 
behaviour of protection sellers, who see the derivatives market as a source of high returns. 
 
Table 3: Average correlations 2001-2007 
 Share returns Bond spread changes 
CDS spread 
changes 
Share returns 1 -0,0765 -0,1124 
Bond spread 
changes -0,0765 1 0,0641 
CDS spread 
changes -0,1124 0,0641 1 
 
 
4. The models and their main results 
4.1. The VAR models used 
The aim of our study is to analyse the inter-temporal relations between three French markets: 
shares, bonds and CDS, represented by thirteen French companies. We therefore felt that 
multivariate modelling would be appropriate, allowing to explain the evolution of one 
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variable on the basis of an extended set of information (the history of the explained variable 
and the history of the explanatory variables)‡‡.  
 
We therefore built two difference VAR models, to bring to light the inter-temporal relations 
between the markets and to verify certan hypotheses: 
- Hypothesis 1: positive share return rates are accompanied by negative variations in CDS and 
bond spreads. 
- Hypothesis 2: the share market and the CDS market influence the bond market. 
- Hypothesis 3: the relation between the share market and the CDS market is stronger than the 
relation between the bond market and the share market. 
- Hypothesis 4: the relation between the share return rate and the variations in credit spreads 
depends positively on the company’s credit risk. The higher the credit risk, the stronger the 
relation. 
- Hypothesis 5: the relation between the share return rate and the variations in credit spreads 
depends negatively on the size of the company. The smaller the company (in terms of 
capitalization), the stronger the relation. 
Observation of our series shows that the share-price, CDS-spreads and bond-spreads variables 
are non-stationary. We therefore conducted stationarity tests, which confirmed the non-
stationarity of the series (Table 4). We transformed our variables into share return rates, first-
difference or variation of bond spreads and (DBOND) first-difference or variation of CDS 
spreads (DCDS). The three stationarity tests carried out on the three variables for each 
company show that the series RS, DBOND and DCDS are indeed stationary. This result is 
supported by the autocorrelation test for a lag of p = 5 days (Table 5). 
 
Table 4: Stationarity tests 
 Augmented DF Test Philipps-Perron Test KPSS test 
Share returns 13 13 13 
Bond spread changes 13 13 13* 
CDS spreads changes 13 13 13 
Number of firms for which the null hypothesis of non-stationary data can be rejected at 5% (*rejected at 1%). 
                                                 
‡‡ Our work is in the line of those carried out by BLANCO, BRENNAN and MARSH (2004), NORDEN and 
WEBER (2004), and ZHU (2004). 
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Table 5: Autocorrelation tests, average period 2001-2007 
 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 
Stock returns 0,0052 -0,0188 -0,0292 0,0096 -0,0240 
Bond spread 
changes -0,1608 -0,0570 -0,0175 -0,0058 0,0165 
CDS spreads 
changes 0,0025 0,0320 0,0344 0,0075 0,0335 
 
We used the following two VAR models: 
- 3 dimensional VAR model (denoted VAR1) for the period 2001 - February 2007; 
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- 2 dimensional VAR model (denoted VAR2) for the period 2001 - February 2008. 
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4.2. The results 
For each company, we estimated the two VAR models for the whole period and for two sub-
periods (from 01/01/01 to 31/12/03 and from 01/01/04 to 08/02/07 for the VAR1 model; from 
01/01/01 to 31/12/03 and from 01/01/04 to 21/02/08 for the VAR2 model). 
 
Over the whole period, and on average for the thirteen companies, the VAR1 model explains 
and predicts the credit spreads better than the share return rates. The average 2R  are higher 
for the credit-spread variables and the significant coefficients are numerous for these two 
variables. The coefficients obtained have the expected signs. Overall, share return rates are 
not very sensitive to variations in bond and CDS spreads; they react negatively to their past 
changes, and increases in DBOND and DCDS spreads lead to a very weak fall in RS return 
rates. The DBOND spread variable reacts essentially to its past evolutions, negatively; it falls 
with a lag when the share return rate rises and it increases weakly with the CDS spread. The 
DCDS spread variable reacts very negatively to an increase in share return rates, positively to 
an increase in bond spreads and positively to its past evolutions (Table 6). 
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 Table 6: VAR1 estimation results over the period 2001-2007 
 RS (1) (2) DBOND (3) (4) DCDS (5) (6) 
0,0047  -17,0458  -34,1031  RS(-1) (0,1718) 4 (-1,3743) 4 (-4,6753) 10 
-0,0207  -9,9410  -29,5817  RS(-2) (-0,7219) 2 (-0,7181) 2 (-3,5251) 9 
-0,0264  -2,6326  -9,7021  RS(-3) (-0,9164) 3 (-0,0011) 2 (-2,4597) 8 
0,0159  -3,0859  -24,9162  RS(-4) (0,5242) 4 (0,0320) 1 (-2,5052) 6 
-0,0201  12,8331  2,5084  RS(-5) (-0,6998) 1 (1,2435) 6 (0,2555) 2 
0,0000  -0,4262  0,0196  DBOND(-1) (-0,5144) 2 (-15,0158) 13 (0,4837) 3 
0,0000  -0,2745  0,0073  DBOND(-2) (-0,1031) 2 (-8,6074) 13 (0,2737) 4 
0,0000  -0,1837  0,0181  DBOND(-3) (0,3662) 2 (-5,6549) 12 (0,5625) 2 
0,0000  -0,1129  0,0096  DBOND(-4) (0,3139) 1 (-3,5586) 9 (0,4231) 2 
0,0000  -0,0415  0,0016  DBOND(-5) (-0,5842) 2 (-1,4929) 3 (0,1497) 2 
0,0006  0,0980  -0,0538  DCDS(-1) (0,9458) 3 (0,8936) 5 (-1,8801) 6 
0,0003  0,0332  -0,0202  DCDS(-2) (0,0765) 3 (0,7522) 4 (-0,6175) 8 
0,0003  0,0244  0,0036  DCDS(-3) (0,2520) 2 (1,3224) 6 (0,2024) 6 
0,0004  0,0134  -0,0174  DCDS(-4) (1,2430) 2 (0,5118) 3 (-0,5510) 3 
0,0004  0,1451  0,0460  DCDS(-5) (0,9333) 3 (0,8609) 4 (1,6601) 7 
0,0002  -0,0505  -0,0827  Const. (a) (0,4691)  (-0,3136)  (-0,4476)  
       
R-squared 0,0265  0,1915  0,1044  
Adj, R-squared 0,0146  0,1816  0,0935  
F-statistic 2,2278  21,1609  9,7340  
Log likelihood 3080,9115  -4282,0556  -2826,7628  
Akaike AIC -4,9032  6,8487  4,4798  
Schwarz SC -4,8374  6,9145  4,5456  
Mean dependent 0,0001  -0,0222  -0,0478  
S,D, dependent 0,0218  9,3616  6,3449  
       
Columns (1), (3), (5) represent mean coefficients. In brackets, we report the mean t-student. Columns (2), (4), (6) 
report the number of firms for which the coefficient of the explanatory variable is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. 
 
Over the sub-period January 2001 - December 2003, the results of the VAR1 model are 
better. The average 2R  of the model are higher than those for the whole period. The model 
explains better a period of declining share market and high, volatile credit spreads. The 
relations between the three markets are stronger during a period of market tension. There 
may, therefore, be a risk of contagion between the three markets. During a period when the 
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share market is rising, on the other hand, the relation between the three markets tends to 
weaken (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: VAR1 estimation results over the period 2001-2003 
 RS (1) (2) DBOND (3) (4) DCDS (5) (6) 
0,0143  -20,5233  -40,7411  RS(-1) (0,3289) 2 (-1,1429) 4 (-3,3373) 9 
-0,0218  -16,6965  -37,3088  RS(-2) (-0,4596) 0 (-0,8500) 1 (-2,7262) 8 
-0,0269  -2,0749  -13,5768  RS(-3) (-0,5765) 1 (-0,1405) 1 (-1,9093) 6 
0,0244  -3,3614  -28,5470  RS(-4) (0,4909) 3 (-0,1255) 1 (-1,7941) 5 
-0,0278  17,6284  -1,0238  RS(-5) (-0,6021) 1 (1,0188) 1 (0,0116) 1 
0,0000  -0,4453  0,0138  DBOND(-1) (-0,4130) 0 (-9,6624) 13 (0,0331) 1 
0,0000  -0,2914  0,0103  DBOND(-2) (-0,2228) 0 (-5,5713) 11 (0,2914) 2 
0,0000  -0,2015  0,0232  DBOND(-3) (0,1874) 2 (-3,7864) 10 (0,4995) 1 
0,0000  -0,1314  0,0150  DBOND(-4) (0,2167) 1 (-2,5183) 7 (0,3589) 2 
-0,0001  -0,0420  0,0037  DBOND(-5) (-0,3997) 1 (-0,9499) 2 (0,0930) 1 
0,0007  0,0906  -0,0884  DCDS(-1) (0,7611) 3 (0,4365) 2 (-1,8004) 6 
0,0004  0,0042  -0,0263  DCDS(-2) (0,3474) 1 (0,5249) 2 (-0,5090) 4 
0,0004  0,0211  -0,0031  DCDS(-3) (0,1924) 0 (1,0207) 3 (0,0599) 7 
0,0004  0,0290  -0,0137  DCDS(-4) (0,9100) 2 (0,5476) 2 (-0,2518) 3 
0,0005  0,1714  0,0480  DCDS(-5) (0,7192) 1 (0,5777) 3 (1,0930) 6 
-0,0003  -0,0756  -0,1451  Const. (a) (-0,1190)  (-0,3287)  (-0,4031)  
       
R-squared 0,0428  0,2190  0,1399  
Adj, R-squared 0,0109  0,1931  0,1114  
F-statistic 1,3422  9,5659  5,0390  
Log likelihood 1065,1197  -1788,3300  -1281,4857  
Akaike AIC -4,3044  7,3390  5,2688  
Schwarz SC -4,1631  7,4803  5,4101  
Mean dependent -0,0004  0,0188  0,0087  
S,D, dependent 0,0293  11,5342  9,1311  
       
Columns (1), (3), (5) represent mean coefficients. In brackets, we report the mean t-student. Columns (2), (4), (6) 
report the number of firms for which the coefficient of the explanatory variable is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. 
 
For the sub-period 2004 - February 2007, the average 2R  obtained are lower and the 
coefficients are less significant. For this sub-period, however, we observe that the credit 
spread variables explain the share return rate variable better than they do over the whole 
period (with the expected negative sign) and the bond spreads appear to react less to the share 
 19
return rate and more to CDS spreads (with the expected positive sign). Finally, the CDS 
spreads react less to increases in share return rates (with the expected negative sign) than to 
their own past evolutions (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: VAR1 estimation results over the period 2004-2007 
 RS (1) (2) DBOND (3) (4) DCDS (5) (6) 
-0,0225  -12,2426  -8,9482  RS(-1) (-0,6074) 1 (-0,6805) 2 (-1,5527) 5 
-0,0192  1,0875  -4,6657  RS(-2) (-0,5137) 1 (0,2959) 0 (-0,4390) 1 
-0,0239  -1,6128  -0,6615  RS(-3) (-0,6657) 2 (0,2015) 1 (0,1389) 1 
-0,0033  3,2225  -3,8490  RS(-4) (-0,0933) 1 (0,5618) 0 (-0,4020) 1 
-0,0090  5,2822  1,9936  RS(-5) (-0,2347) 0 (0,4607) 0 (-0,1578) 2 
-0,0001  -0,4814  0,0157  DBOND(-1) (-0,5506) 3 (-13,0205) 13 (0,8276) 2 
0,0000  -0,3283  0,0080  DBOND(-2) (-0,1882) 3 (-7,8160) 13 (0,3509) 2 
0,0000  -0,2103  0,0075  DBOND(-3) (-0,0989) 1 (-4,8521) 12 (0,2236) 2 
-0,0001  -0,1192  0,0044  DBOND(-4) (-0,5279) 1 (-2,8616) 10 (0,3554) 0 
-0,0001  -0,0520  0,0084  DBOND(-5) (-0,7223) 2 (-1,4108) 2 (0,6590) 1 
0,0004  0,2337  0,0353  DCDS(-1) (0,4340) 0 (2,0010) 5 (0,9499) 13 
-0,0006  0,2593  -0,0334  DCDS(-2) (-0,8405) 2 (0,6450) 2 (-0,8514) 5 
-0,0001  0,1991  0,0229  DCDS(-3) (0,1561) 0 (1,1296) 2 (0,6557) 4 
0,0005  0,1121  -0,0009  DCDS(-4) (0,6229) 0 (0,7927) 1 (-0,0075) 2 
0,0002  0,0211  0,0339  DCDS(-5) (0,4894) 2 (0,5253) 2 (0,9372) 3 
0,0005  -0,0224  -0,0691  Const. (a) (0,9891)  (-0,1653)  (-0,8092)  
       
R-squared 0,0254  0,2140  0,0953  
Adj, R-squared 0,0058  0,1982  0,0771  
F-statistic 1,3157  14,0721  5,3888  
Log likelihood 2192,8224  -2309,4307  -936,5150  
Akaike AIC -5,7117  6,0967  2,4292  
Schwarz SC -5,6143  6,1942  2,5267  
Mean dependent 0,0004  -0,0455  -0,0843  
S,D, dependent 0,0145  6,9592  2,1017  
       
Columns (1), (3), (5) represent mean coefficients. In brackets, we report the mean t-student. Columns (2), (4), (6) 
report the number of firms for which the coefficient of the explanatory variable is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level. 
The relations that appear to dominate are those of the share market towards the CDS market, 
the share market towards the bond market and the CDS market towards the bond market. 
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To test the consequences of the current subprime crisis on the relations of interdependence 
between the share market and the CDS market, we estimated the VAR2 model. Two main 
conclusions can be drawn from our results. Firstly, the bond market appears to be relevant for 
explaining the evolutions of the other two markets, especially the CDS market (for the three 
periods, the average 2R  obtained for the DCDS equation of the VAR2 model are lower than 
those of the VAR1 model). Secondly, the relations of interdependence between the markets 
are stronger during periods of financial instability. The VAR2 model explains better the 
unstable sub-period 2001-2003 (average 2R  higher than for the whole period and average 2R  
of the DCDS equation close to those obtained with the VAR1 model) and show a 
strengthening of the relation between the share returns and CDS spreads of the companies 
most affected by the crisis (the 2R  of the RS and DCDS equations are higher over the reccent 
period 2004-2008 that for the whole period for the Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Danone, 
Renault, and Total). For the period 2004-2008, we obtain higher and more significant average 
coefficients and the share return rates appear to react more strongly to variations in CDS 
spreads than to their own past evolutions (Table 9). 
 
We have verified the relations of causality between these three markets over the whole period 
using the Granger test. For eleven of the thirteen companies, there is a relation of causality 
from share return rates to CDS spreads, and this causality is bidirectional for eight of the 
eleven companies. For eight out of thirteen companies, there is a relation of causality from 
CDS spreads to bond spreads, and this causality is bidirectional for six of the eight 
companies. For the companies with high credit risk, and therefore with low ratings, there is a 
relation of causality between their share return, their bond spread and their CDS spread. On 
the contrary, there is no relation of causality between these markets for the company with the 
best credit rating, which is also a company with large market capitalization (Table 10). 
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Table 9: VAR2 estimation results over the period 2004-2008 
 RS (1) (2) DCDS (3) (4) 
-0,0115  -12,4042  RS(-1) (-0,3657) 0 (-2,4983) 9 
0,0036  -9,0604  RS(-2) (0,1103) 0 (-1,4831) 5 
-0,0427  -1,8805  RS(-3) (-1,3535) 3 (-0,1164) 1 
0,0022  -3,1933  RS(-4) (0,0640) 2 (-0,7997) 0 
-0,0267  4,8128  RS(-5) (-0,8304) 1 (0,6724) 1 
0,0004  0,0947  DCDS(-1) (1,1957) 4 (2,9724) 10 
-0,0002  0,0075  DCDS(-2) (-0,7676) 3 (0,2691) 6 
-0,0004  0,0921  DCDS(-3) (-0,9574) 2 (2,7894) 9 
0,0000  -0,0388  DCDS(-4) (-0,0505) 0 (-1,1446) 4 
-0,0001  0,0043  DCDS(-5) (0,0626) 3 (0,1493) 3 
0,0001  0,0626  Const. (a) (0,3929)  (1,3870)  
     
R-squared 0,0180  0,0616  
Adj, R-squared 0,0086  0,0527  
F-statistic 1,9330  7,0034  
Log likelihood 2949,4742  -2033,6641  
Akaike AIC -5,5286  3,8470  
Schwarz SC -5,4772  3,8984  
Mean dependent 0,0001  0,0745  
S,D, dependent 0,0157  2,8049  
     
Columns (1), (3) represent mean coefficients. In brackets, we report the mean t-student. Columns (2), (4) report 
the number of firms for which the coefficient of the explanatory variable is significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level. 
 
We have sought to verify whether the current crisis has weakened the relations of causality 
between the share market and the CDS market. Our results show that this crisis has led to an 
increase in the number of causalities. According to the VAR1 model and for the sub-period 
2004-2007, there is a relation of causality from share returns to CDS spreads for four 
companies; when we introduce the crisis (VAR2 model) this relation is verified for nine 
companies: the previous ones plus those in the financial sector and the big groups. Before the 
crisis, the relation of causality from CDS spreads to share returns existed for one sole 
company; since the crisis, this relation concerns four companies (Table 11). 
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 Table 10: Granger causality Tests (VAR1 model) 
 DBOND 
cause RS 
RS cause 
DBOND 
DCDS cause 
RS 
RS cause 
DCDS 
DCDS cause 
DBOND 
DBOND 
cause DCDS 
Alcatel yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sanofi-
Aventis no no yes yes no no 
BNP Paribas no no yes yes no no 
Bouygues no no no yes yes yes 
Carrefour no no no yes no yes 
Danone no no yes no yes yes 
France 
Télécom no yes no yes yes no 
Pinault PR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Rhodia no yes yes yes yes no 
Renault no yes no yes yes yes 
Société 
Générale no no yes yes yes no 
Sodexho no no yes yes yes no 
Total no no no no no no 
TOTAL 2 5 8 11 9 6 
 
Table 11: Granger causality Tests (comparison of the VAR models results) 
 Global period* Sub period 1** Sub period 2*** 
 
RS cause 
DCDS 
DCDS cause 
RS 
RS cause 
DCDS 
DCDS cause 
RS 
RS cause 
DCDS 
DCDS cause 
RS 
VAR1 
model 
11 8 10 2 4 1 
VAR2 
model 
11 6 11 3 9 4 
*: 2001-2007 for VAR1 and 2001-2008 for VAR2; **: 2001-2003 for VAR1 and VAR2; ***: 2004-2007 for 
VAR1 and 2004-2008 for VAR2. 
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As our results highlight the existence of a relation of causality between share returns and 
credit spreads, we thought it appropriate to study the effet of a share market shock of the CDS 
and bond markets (the three markets being represented by our thirteen companies). We 
expected an instant rise in credit spreads following a fall in share return rates, and conversely 
a rise in share return rates should cause an instant fall in spreads. Figures 5, 6 and 7 display 
the impulse response functions: how do credit spreads react to a share return rate shock?§§. 
We consider that the amplitude of the shock is equal to the standard deviation, and we 
observe the effects of the shock over fifteen periods, i.e. fifteen days***. The share return rate 
shock has an immediate impact on CDS and bond spreads and the consequences of the shock 
disappear after seven days. The reaction of the CDS market to a share return rate shock is 
stronger and lasts longer than the reaction of the bond market. According to the impulse 
response functions obtained using the VAR2 model applied to the sub-period 2004-2008, the 
CDS spreads react immediately to a share return rate shock, with a fall in the share market 
causing an instant rise in spreads on the CDS market. This rise is absorbed in almost linear 
fashion in less than six days.  
 
Figure 5: Reponse of DCDS TO RS (VAR1, 2001-2007)  
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§§ We estimated the impulse response function for each company and then weighted our results by the ratio of 
the market capitalization of the company to the total capitalization of the thirteen companies to obtain figures 5, 
6 and 7. 
*** We used the Cholesky decomposition. 
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Figure 6: Response of DBOND to RS (VAR1, 2001-2007) 
-1,000
-0,800
-0,600
-0,400
-0,200
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mean High Low
 
 
Figure 7 : Reponse of DCDS TO RS (VAR2, 2004-2008)
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5. Conclusion 
 
The credit derivatives market has developed rapidly over the last ten years. The credit default 
swaps that dominate this market are used as instruments of credit risk coverage, but they are 
also used by investors for portfolio diversification. Investors adopt strategies of coverage, 
behaviours of arbitrage between the markets that are conducive to the propagation of 
instability between markets. The theoretical models of credit risk assessment bring to light 
relations between the share, bond and CDS markets. In this article, we have sought to conduct 
a long-period analysis of the relations between the French markets between 2001 and 2008. 
Analysis of the survey data and the results of the VAR models used both suggest that the 
 25
three markets are interconnected, and that this interconnection is all the stronger when the 
markets experience tensions. The influence of the French share market on the CDS and bond 
markets is proven, as is the influence of the CDS market on the bond market. During a period 
of tension on the share market, this interconnection between the markets can favour financial 
instability. 
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